JAAAT TECHNICAL SERVICES, LLC v. TETRA TECH TESORO, INC.
JAAAT Technical Services, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr., DurretteCrump PLC, Christine A. Williams, DurretteCrump PLC, John Buckley Warden, IV, DurretteCrump PLC & S. Sadiq Gill, DurretteCrump PLC.
Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc., Defendant, represented by Neil Samuel Lowenstein, Vandeventer Black LLP, Dustin Mitchell Paul, Vandeventer Black LLP & Richard Hooper Ottinger, Vandeventer Black LLP.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
M. HANNAH LAUCK,
District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on two motions: (1) Defendant
Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc.'s ("Tesoro") Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction ("Motion to Dismiss"), (ECF No. 18); and,
(2) Tesoro's Motion to Disregard Improper Filing, (ECF No. 23). With
respect to the Motion to Dismiss, Tesoro contends, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
1
that the Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead this Court's
subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff JAAAT Technical
Services, LLC ("JAAAT") responded to the Motion to Dismiss, Tesoro
replied, and JAAAT filed a surreply.
2 (ECF Nos. 20, 21, 22.)
In response to JAAAT's surreply, Tesoro filed the Motion to Disregard
Improper Filing, which argues, pursuant to United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia Local Rule of Civil Procedure
7(F)(1), that the Court should strike JAAAT's filing as improper. (ECF
No. 24.) JAAAT responded to the Motion to Disregard Improper Filing, and
Tesoro replied. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.)
The materials before the Court adequately present the facts and legal
contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. Both
matters are ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, the
Court will deny both Tesoro's Motion to Dismiss and Tesoro's Motion to
Disregard Improper Filing.
I. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the burden rests
with the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction, to prove that
federal jurisdiction is proper.
See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Va. Int'l Terminals, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1335, 1338 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing
McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936);
Adams v. Bain, 691 F.2d 1213,
1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss can attack
subject matter jurisdiction in two ways. First, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
may attack the complaint on its face, asserting that the complaint fails
to state a claim upon which subject matter jurisdiction can lie.
See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. at 1338;
see also Adams,
691 F.2d at 1219. In such a facial challenge, a court assumes the truth
of the facts alleged by plaintiff, thereby functionally affording the
plaintiff the same procedural protection he or she would receive under
Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.
3 See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. at 1338;
see also Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may also challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from the pleadings.
See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991);
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. at 1338;
see also Adams,
697 F.2d at 1219. In such a factual challenge, no presumptive
truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence
of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from
evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.
See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. at 1338;
see also Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.
If the facts necessary to determine jurisdiction are intertwined with
the facts central to the merits of the dispute, the proper course of
action is for the court to find that jurisdiction exists and then to
resolve the factual dispute on the merits unless the claim is made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, or is determined to be
wholly insubstantial and frivolous.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946);
United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 580 (4th Cir. 1999);
Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Summary of Allegations in the Amended Complaint4
This dispute arises from Tesoro's alleged breach of five subcontracts
regarding five construction projects at three military bases (the
"Military Base Projects").
5
At each Military Base Project, JAAAT acted as the general contractor
and Tesoro acted as a subcontractor. Specifically, Tesoro "was to serve
as the project manager for each of the [Military Base Projects] and do
the majority of the work on each project and was solely responsible for
the management, scheduling, and impact of any delay for the work that it
performed." (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) "[Tesoro] breached the pertinent
Subcontract[s] and its duties" by "fail[ing] to adequately perform the
work required" and incurring "substantial delays in the performance of
its work on each project." (
Id. ¶ 28.) JAAAT alleges that it has
suffered damages as a result of Tesoro's breaches. JAAAT seeks damages
with regard to each project, costs and expenses, and pre- and
post-judgment interest.
B. Procedural History
On April 17, 2015, JAAAT filed its Complaint against Tesoro seeking
damages for Tesoro's alleged breach of five subcontracts regarding the
Military Base Projects at the Military Bases.
6
(ECF No. 1.) JAAAT contended subject matter jurisdiction exists
pursuant to federal enclave jurisdiction. On May 11, 2015, Tesoro moved
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.) JAAAT
responded, and Tesoro replied. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.)
On July 8, 2015, the parties appeared for oral argument on the motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and an evidentiary
hearing on JAAAT's jurisdictional allegations. On July 9, 2015, the
Court granted the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 15.) The Court further
granted JAAAT leave to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 2015,
JAAAT filed the Amended Complaint, attaching numerous exhibits it has
defined as "Jurisdictional Documents." (
See Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) In
light of the allegations contained in and appended to the Amended
Complaint, Tesoro's motion to dismiss now presents, as characterized by
the party, "a pure question of law." (Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3,
ECF No. 19.) JAAAT has responded to this legal challenge, Tesoro has
replied, and JAAAT has filed a surreply. (ECF Nos. 20, 21, 22.)
7
III. Analysis
For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Tesoro's Motion to
Dismiss. Framing its facial challenge here as a matter of first
impression, Tesoro contends that subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist because JAAAT's breach of contract claims do not
arise under
federal law. Tesoro advances this argument despite conceding, for
purposes of its facial challenge, that the Military Bases constitute
federal enclaves. Tesoro likewise does not refute JAAAT's allegations—or
evidence
8—that the federal government possesses exclusive legislative power over the Military Bases.
Instead, Tesoro outlines the issue as follows: "Does a federal court
have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a contractual dispute over
events on a federal enclave if the parties have contracted to have state
law apply and the suit raises no substantial federal question?" (Def.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3.) Faced with this clear-cut question of law,
the extensive briefing from the parties perplexes the Court. A
longstanding body of constitutional law analyzing federal enclaves
squarely demonstrates that Tesoro's argument is misguided.
"A federal enclave is created when a state cedes jurisdiction over
land within its border to the federal government and Congress accepts
that cession."
Alison v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d 1234,
1235 (10th Cir. 2012). "[A]fter a state has transferred authority over a
tract of land creating a federal enclave, the state may no longer
impose new state laws on the land."
9 Id. Rather, the state law in place at the time of cession continues in force as federal law.
See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94,
100 (1940). This so-called "federalized" state law, in turn, confers on
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims otherwise
characterized as "state law," such as the contract disputes here.
See Alison, 689 F.3d at 1235.
The parties' contractual agreement to apply Virginia law does not
disturb this conclusion. The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution
10
establishes that the application of federal law supersedes the
application of state law. The Supremacy Clause mandates that when events
giving rise to a lawsuit occur on a federal enclave, the Court must
apply the enclave's federalized state law. Thus, the Court cannot find
that claims arising on federal enclaves—and thus governed by federal
law—somehow arise under state law. The Court concludes that the exercise
of federal enclave jurisdiction is appropriate in this case.
A. This Court Possesses Subject Matter Jurisdiction over JAAAT's Claims
Because the events giving rise to JAAAT's claims occurred on the
Military Bases, the Court finds that JAAAT's claims arise under federal
law. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the burden
of establishing jurisdiction rests with the party asserting it—here,
JAAAT.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);
Hartley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 187 F.3d 422,
425 (4th Cir. 1999). As the basis for the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction, JAAAT cites 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Thus, subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate provided JAAAT meets
its burden of demonstrating that the asserted claims arise under federal
law, which JAAAT has done by invoking the federal enclave doctrine. The
Court will trace in greater detail the jurisdictional limits of the
federal enclave doctrine to explain the basis of this finding.
1. The Jurisdictional Limits of the Federal Enclave Doctrine
a. The Federal Enclave Doctrine Requires Courts to Apply So-Called "Federalized State Law" When Appropriate
The federal enclave doctrine, which empowers Congress to exclusively
regulate properties acquired from state governments, arises from Article
I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution (the "Federal
Enclave Clause"):
Congress shall have the Power ... To exercise exclusive Legislation
in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of
Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings
....
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
Under the federal enclave doctrine, when "the United States acquires
with the `consent' of the state legislature land within the borders of
that State ... the jurisdiction of the Federal Government becomes
`exclusive.'"
Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245,
264 (1963). This legislative "power of Congress over federal enclaves
... is obviously the same as the power of Congress over the District of
Columbia" and "by its own weight, bars state regulation without specific
congressional action."
Id. at 263. Thus, the law applied to federal enclaves must be that of the federal government, and not the states.
11 See Pac. Coast Dairy v. Dep't of Ag. of Cal., 318 U.S. 285, 294 (1943);
see also Allison,
689 F.3d at 1237 ("The central principle of [the] federal enclave
doctrine is that Congress has exclusive legislative authority over these
enclaves.").
In the absence of subsequent federal legislation displacing state
law, "the [state] law in effect at the time of the transfer of
jurisdiction [from the state to United States] continues in force" on
the federal enclave.
James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 100.
12
Importantly, "future statutes of the state are not a part of the body
of laws in the ceded area," and "Congressional action is necessary to
keep [the laws of the federal enclave] current."
Id. at 100;
see also Paul,
371 U.S. at 268 ("Since a State may not legislate with respect to a
federal enclave unless it reserved the right to do so when it gave its
consent to the purchase by the United States, only state law existing at
the time of the acquisition remains enforceable, not subsequent
laws."). Subsequent state common law also does not apply.
Allison,
689 F.3d at 1240 (explaining that "[w]hen a state speaks through its
courts, it creates new law no less than when it speaks through the
legislature").
b. Federal Courts Possess Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Lawsuits Arising Out of Events Occurring on Federal Enclaves
Where Congress has
exclusive power to pass legislation
affecting a federal enclave, federal courts possess subject matter
jurisdiction over lawsuits arising out of events that occur on that
territory. This is because, in effect, Congress's "exclusive legislative
jurisdiction ... federalizes state law."
Jones v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc.,
No. Civ. CCB-11-2374, 2012 WL 1197391, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 2012).
Stated differently, "any law existing in territory over which the United
States has exclusive sovereignty must derive its authority and force
from the United States and is for that reason federal law."
Akin v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 851 F.Supp. 819, 821-22 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (citing
Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123,
124 (5th Cir. 1952)). As explained by one court of appeals, "[i]t would
be incongruous to hold that although the United States has exclusive
sovereignty in the area here involved, its courts are without power to
adjudicate controversies arising there."
Mater, 200 F.2d at 124.
Numerous courts of appeals, including the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have adopted this longstanding position.
13 Likewise, courts in this District have consistently applied it.
See, e.g., Federico v. Lincoln Military Rous., 901 F.Supp.2d 654,
665 (E.D. Va. 2012) ("The law appears clear that `where exclusive
jurisdiction is ceded to the United States, the laws of the state at the
time of cession will continue in effect as federal law, and subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is proper.'" (quoting
Melendez v. Glastic Corp., No. 2:95cv1112, 1996 WL 35020766, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 1996));
14 Anderson v. Crown Cork & Seal, 93 F.Supp.2d 697,
700 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("Litigation arising from lands obtained pursuant
to [the Federal Enclave Clause] is rightfully pursued in federal court
under federal enclave jurisdiction.");
McCormick v. C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 400,
402 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("[S]uits regarding property purchased [pursuant to
the Federal Enclave Clause] are to occur in the federal courts of the
United States."). Thus, it is undisputed that "claims arising on a
federal enclave provide a separate and independent basis for federal
question jurisdiction."
15 Federico, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 663 n.2.
2. JAAAT's Claims Arise Under Federal Law
a. JAAAT's Claims Constitute Federalized State Law Claims
For purposes of this facial challenge, the parties do not dispute
that each Military Base Project is located on a federal enclave. (Def.
Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4 n.1 ("Whether the relevant military bases are
actually federal enclaves is not at issue in this motion."); Def. Reply
1, ECF No. 21 ("The dispositive issue is not whether the military bases
are federal enclaves, because Tesoro concedes they are for purposes of
the motion.").) Further, JAAAT properly alleges that the events giving
rise to its breach of contract claims occurred on the Military Bases.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 55.) Thus, the breach of contract claims asserted by JAAAT
constitute federalized state law claims.
See Federico, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
Tesoro, nonetheless, contends that causes of action asserting
federalized state law do not actually arise under federal law.
Seemingly, Tesoro argues that these causes of action arise under state
law because state law originally "created" the cause of action. (
See Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 7 (citing
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148,
151 (4th Cir. 1994) ("In determining whether an action presents a
federal question under § 1331, a court must first discern whether
federal or state law creates the cause of action.")).) This argument
fails. Tesoro misreads the effect of a state's decision to cede
exclusive jurisdiction to the United States. As multiple courts in this
District flatly conclude: "When exclusive jurisdiction is ceded to the
United States, the laws of the state at the time of the cession
will continue in effect as federal law, and subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is proper."
Melendez, 1996 WL 35020766, at *2 (emphasis added) (citing
James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 97);
see also Federico, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 665;
Anderson, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 699;
McCormick,
977 F. Supp. at 402. Whether a state initially "created" the cause of
action has no bearing on whether a federal court has jurisdiction over
its now-federal nature. Tesoro's attempt to cherry-pick language
regarding which government "created" the law does not persuade. By their
federalized nature, JAAAT's claims arise under federal law.
See Federico, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
b. Parties Cannot "Opt Out" of the Application of Federal Law
In spite of well-settled law that even common law claims arising on a
federal enclave provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction,
Tesoro posits that the choice of law clause here somehow precludes a
finding of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Tesoro contends
that "[i]f the parties have selected Virginia law by an enforceable
choice of law provision, then only questions of Virginia law will be at
issue." (Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 8.) This novel argument—which
essentially advances the idea that parties to a contract, by their
choosing, may negate the application of federal law—misses the mark.
Interpreting the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has explained
that "[i]t is a seminal principle of our law `that the constitution and
the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the
constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled
by them.'"
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178 (1976) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 426 (1819)). Corollary to this principle, "[i]t is of the
very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within
its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate
governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence."
16 Id. (quoting
McCulloch, 4 Wheat. at 427). Thus, "it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is `without effect.'"
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
746 (1981)). As noted by one court, "[t]he [S]upremacy [C]lause of the
United States Constitution establishes a constitutional choice-of-law
rule, mak[ing] federal law paramount ...."
Viva! Int'l Voice For Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3do 569, 571 (Cal. 2007);
see also Alison,
689 F.3d at 1235 ("[The] Federal enclave doctrine operates as a choice
of law doctrine that dictates which law applies to causes of action
arising on these lands.").
17
Here, Tesoro argues for the application of state law in spite of the
existence of federal law—federalized state law—that governs the dispute.
18
In light of the Supremacy Clause, only federal law may apply to JAAAT's
claims. The parties' election to the contrary does not override the
Constitution.
Cf. Pac. Coast Dairy, 318 U.S. at 294 ("To hold
otherwise would be to affirm that California may ignore the
Constitutional provision that `This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; ....'" (omissions in original)). Accordingly,
assuming the truth of JAAAT's well-pleaded allegations, the claims arise
under federal law, and subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate here.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Tesoro's Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 18) and will deny Tesoro's Motion to Disregard Improper
Filing (ECF No. 23).
An appropriate Order shall issue.
FootNotes
1. "[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
2. JAAAT titled its surreply as
"Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction." (ECF No. 22.)
3. Tesoro limits its challenge to
a facial one. (Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2 ("As this matter is
before the Court on a facial challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, a
detailed description of the dispute is of little benefit.").)
4. The Court assumes the
well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint to be true and will
view them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as would be required
for Rule 12(b)(6) review.
See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
5. The military bases at issue
are: (1) Fort Bragg (located in North Carolina); (2) Fort Gordon
(located in Georgia); and, (3) Fort Benning (located in Georgia)
(collectively, the "Military Bases"). The subcontracts between JAAAT and
Tesoro at Fort Bragg concerned the construction of a training facility
("Fort Bragg Training Facility Project"), a flight simulator ("Fort
Bragg Flight Simulator Project"), and a brigade headquarters ("Fort
Bragg Brigade Headquarters Project").
6. This dispute is one of many
between JAAAT and Tesoro across numerous federal and state jurisdictions
regarding the Military Base Projects.
7. In response to JAAAT's
surreply, Tesoro filed the Motion to Disregard Improper Filing. (ECF No.
23.) JAAAT has responded to that motion, and Tesoro has replied. (ECF
Nos. 25, 26.)
Despite Tesoro's objection, the Court elects to consider JAAAT's
improperly filed surreply, as well as the subsequent filings submitted
by each party. Local Civil Rule 7(F)(1) states in pertinent part:
Fallowing the submission of a responsive brief and a reply brief, "[n]o
further briefs or written communications may be filed without first
obtaining leave of Court." E.D. Va. Loe. Civ. R. 7(F)(1).
Notwithstanding JAAAT's failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 7(F)(1),
in the interest of justice, the Court will consider all filings before
it. Tesoro utilized its Motion to Disregard Improper Filing to attack
the new arguments set forth by JAAAT and will not be prejudiced by
consideration of the filing along with its own motion. The Court will
deny Tesoro's Motion to Disregard Improper Filing.
8. JAAAT's Amended Complaint
attaches the Jurisdictional Documents, which purport to establish that
the Military Bases are federal enclaves over which the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction. (
See ECF Nos. 16-1-16-11.) Tesoro does
not challenge the sufficiency of the Jurisdictional Documents. While
subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time,
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
506 (2006), the Court presumes that Tesoro, in the interest of judicial
economy, would have disputed the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction at
the earliest possible opportunity.
9. This also is true for state
common law causes of action developed after a state cedes its land.
Courts have identified this logical corollary: "it would be an odd
arrangement if a state judicial branch had the power to create binding
common law that exceeded the reach of the state legislative branch."
Alison, 689 F.3d at 1240
10. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. The Supreme Court
recognizes at least three exceptions to the rule that the United States
holds exclusive legislative jurisdiction over federal enclaves:
1) where Congress has, by statute, provided a different rule; 2)
where the state explicitly retained the right to legislate over specific
matters at the time of cession; and[,] 3) where minor regulatory
changes modify laws existing at the time of cession.
Allison, 689 F.3d at 1237. Tesoro does not allege, and the Court does not find, that any of these exceptions pertain here.
12. The continuation of state
law as federal law "assures that no area however small will be left
without a developed legal system for private rights."
James Stewart & Co., 309 U.S. at 100. Congress has enacted some assimilated laws, particularly criminal laws, to apply in federal enclaves.
Alison,
589 F.3d at 1237. Congress also has allowed application of state law to
some civil claims, including wrongful death, workers' and unemployment
compensation, and fish and game regulation.
Id. "But in many
important areas of law that are traditionally the responsibility of
states ... [including contract law] ... there is no federal assimilative
statute."
Id. at 1237-38.
This circumstance does not exist in the absence of criticism.
See, e.g., Chad DeVeaux,
Trapped in the Amber: State Common Law, Employee Rights, and Federal Enclaves,
77 Brook. L. Rev. 499, 503 (2012) ("With respect to legal areas
neglected by Congress, federal enclaves have devolved into
jurisprudential Jurassic Parks, `sanctuar[ies] for the obsolete
restrictions of the common law.'" (quoting
Capetola v. Barclay-White Co., 48 F.Supp. 797, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1943)).
13.
See, e.g., Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662,
665-66 (4th Cir. 1959) (finding federal district court possessed
jurisdiction over non-diverse parties for personal injuries on a federal
enclave);
accord Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding removal proper where tort claims allegedly occurred on a federal enclave);
Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030,
1034 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that "[p]ersonal injury actions which
arise from incidents occurring in federal enclaves may be removed to
federal district court as part of federal question jurisdiction");
Mater, 200 F.2d at 124-25 (finding that federal courts have jurisdiction over torts committed on federal enclaves).
14. While the
Federico court favorably cited
Melendez for the premise that state laws continue as federal laws upon the cession of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, the
Federico court disagreed with the
Melendez
court's decision to apply state law when concurrent jurisdiction
existed over the Norfolk Naval Base between the United States and
Virginia.
Federico, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 665, 668-69, 671 (distinguishing
Melendez with respect to concurrent jurisdiction analysis).
In
Melendez, the district court granted a motion to remand an
action alleging personal injuries resulting from an explosion that
occurred at the Norfolk Naval Base.
Melendez, 1996 WL 35020766, at * 1. The
Melendez
court found that because Virginia and the United States shared
concurrent jurisdiction over the Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia's laws "do
not continue in effect as federal law conferring original jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."
Id. at *3. The
Melendez court remanded the action back to state court due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at *4.
Melendez does not affect the Court's determination here. JAAAT
does not allege, nor does Tesoro argue, that concurrent jurisdiction
exists over the Military Bases.
15. Congress's exclusive
authority to pass legislation affecting a federal enclave does not
necessarily confer on federal courts
exclusive judicial jurisdiction.
See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
481 (1981) ("Nothing inherent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a
territory precludes a state court from entertaining a personal injury
suit concerning events occurring in the territory and governed by
federal law." (citing
Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 (1917)). Thus, in light of concurrent judicial jurisdiction, JAAAT could have brought this case in state court.
16. The
Hancock court
addressed the Supremacy Clause in tandem with the Federal Enclave Clause
and concluded that "the activities of the Federal Government are free
from regulation by any state."
Hancock, 426 U.S. at 178 (quoting
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943)).
17. As one commenter has explained: "The Supremacy Clause ... dictates that courts apply the traditional
lex loci
doctrine—that `the law of the [place] where the wrong occurred' governs
an action—to transactions arising within federal enclaves." DeVeaux,
supra, at 528 (quoting Lea Brilmayer,
Conflict of Laws 17 (4th ed. 1995)). Thus, "when the pertinent events giving rise to a suit `occurred on a federal enclave' the court
must apply the federalized state law applicable on the enclave."
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
18. The Court need not decide,
for purposes of this motion, the precise contours of JAAAT's causes of
action as they existed, under then-applicable state law, when the United
States obtained exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the Military
Bases.
